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In spite of relevant diﬀerences between countries, a common international
pattern emerges: daughters leave parental homes earlier than sons. Drawing
upon the European Community Household Panel, we explore the impacts
of various factors that aﬀect daughters’ and sons’ home-leaving decisions.
Results show that the decisions of daughters appear to be more responsive to
environmental factors than sons’. This implies that policies aiming to speed
up the transition to adulthood might have important economic impact on the
existing gender diﬀerences in family formation and household responsibilities
and income inequality across young men and women..
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A general feature of transitions to adulthood in contemporary developed
societies is that, young adults tend to study longer, enter the labor mar-
ket later, leave the parental home, cohabit, marry, and become parents
later. Recent data show striking diﬀerences in the timing of leaving home
for adult children across Europe. Figure 1 shows that in Finland and Den-
mark, children leave the household between 18 and 22 and after that age a
very negligible proportion still cohabit with their parents. At the other end
of the spectrum, in Southern countries, a negligible proportion leaves the
household between 18 and 22 and most of them remain home until 30.
The so called “latest-late” pattern of transition to adulthood (Billari et
al. 2002) is linked to a rising age at which young adults complete their
education and enter the labor market, leave home, form union and ﬁrst
give birth. In spite of the diﬀerences between countries, a common pattern
emerges across countries studied: young women leave home earlier than
men.
While several papers have noticed these diﬀerences no research to our
knowledge has speciﬁc a l l ye x p l o r e dt h ed i ﬀerence between the impacts of
household and institutional factors on daughters and sons’ cohabitation
across various countries.
In order to analyze this issue, we use the European Community House-
hold Panel (ECHP henceforth), a large international dataset on house-
holds.We complement this information with indicators of local marriage and
labor markets and control for other potential eﬀects, such as diﬀerences in
ﬁnancial markets imperfections and social expenditures directed youth.
We ﬁnd that personal and household characteristics and institutional set-
tings are important determinants of co-residence patterns and the size and
sign of their impact, moreover diﬀers signiﬁcantly by gender. Daughters’
home-leaving decisions are more responsive to changes in the family struc-
ture as well as in the characteristics of the environment and these impacts
are stronger and more signiﬁcant in Southern European countries. Given
the slower transition of boys to independent living in these contexts, these
results are potentially important for policy implications
In Section 2 we review the recent literature and discuss the objectives
and implications of our research. In Section 3 we describe the data set
and the characteristics of the sample. In Sections 4 and 5, we present our
econometric strategy and discuss the empirical estimates. Section 6 provide
conclusive remarks and discussions of policy implications.
12 Recent literature
A large number of studies analyzing adult children living arrangements have
explored the factors aﬀecting the transition towards independent living. The
seminal paper of Mc Elroy (1985) and other research has emphasized the role
of the family as an insurance mechanism against employment risk. Thus,
youth live with parents longer in order to gain insure against unemployment,
that the market does not provide. Parent’s income can support children ei-
ther by supplying space and support within the parental house. They can
also support by transferring resources to allow them to achieve an indepen-
dent leaving. Parents’ resources appear to be an important factor which
aﬀects the tradeoﬀ between living at home and living independently. Le
Blanc and Wolﬀ (2006) show positive eﬀects of both parents’ and children
income on leaving home decision.
While parental resources are important to determine the tradeoﬀ be-
tween living at home or living independently, the institutional characteris-
tics of the environment also play a role. The most important institution
which may aﬀect the independence of youths is the labor market. Card and
Lemieux (2000) and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) show that the proba-
bility of living with parents is higher among unemployed and low-income
groups in Canada and the US. The insurance mechanism is particularly
important in Southern Europe where unemployment rates are higher and
t h ew e l f a r es t a t eo ﬀers less protection to the unemployed or less support to
young job seekers (Fogli, 1999, and Becker et al.,2004)
Another important institution aﬀecting the cost of adult children leaving
the parental home has to do with the housing market. Since housing is a
major item in the expenditures of young households and is also one major
potential source of economies of scale in consumption, one expects that local
housing prices faced by young households, play a role on the cohabitation
decisions of young adults. This inﬂuence has been highlighted empirically by
several authors who ﬁnd that higher housing prices discourage living inde-
pendently, essentially by raising the value of joint consumption of housing in
the parental dwelling. Martins and Villanueva (2006) show that limited ac-
cess to credit markets explains why young adults live with their parents.and
diﬀerences in credit market imperfections within Europe can explain up to
20 percent of the cross- country variance of establishing a new household.
Similar results emerge in individual countries ’research:Ermisch (1999) for
the UK, Martínez-Granado and Ruiz-Castillo (2002) for Spain and Giannelli
and Monfardini (2003) for Italy.
But being independent can have diﬀerent meanings: agents can choose to
2live alone, live with a friend or to get married. Another strand of literature
investigates the important role of the marriage market. As follows from
theoretical models of marriage when women are scarce relative to men, i.e.,
the higher the sex ratio,there is an impact on labour supply, marriage, and
divorce (i.e. Grossbard and Amuedo Dorantes, 2007).
Other research has included directly and indirectly the role of cultural
diﬀerences,Giuliano (2007) uses a sample of second-generation immigrants in
the US to disentangle the cultural eﬀects from contemporaneous economic
factors and ﬁnds that youth of Southern European origin live longer and
happier in their parents’ homes.Manacorda and Moretti (2007) also pro-
vide evidence on the positive association between parental happiness and
coresidence in Sourthern Europe. Using data from the World Value Sur-
vey, co-residence with children has a high and positive eﬀect on parental
happiness in Italy, Spain and Portugal; while co-residence with children is
negatively associated with parental happiness in France, Great Britain and
West Germany. Consistently with this, Mazzuco (2006) compares the causal
impact of children leaving home on parents (measured through subjective
life satisfaction and health status) and ﬁnds that when Italian children leave
the parental home, the well-being of parents (their mothers in particular)
worsens, while the opposite is true in other countries.
Another way to explore the impact of culture is to group contries with
similar welfare states which implicitly or explicitly may favor various types
of living arrangements: Esping Andersen (1999) and Mayer (2001). While
in Northern European countries (liberal and social democratic regimes) an
early age of leaving home is the norm, in the Southern European ones, a
very late age prevails1. Each of the welfare regimes are strongly intertwined
with culture and family ties (Dalla Zuanna and Micheli 2004, Chiuri and
Del Boca, 2008)2. Aasve et al (2002) show that a meager welfare state in
the South is compensated by strong family ties, while a generous one in the
North is associated with weak intergenerational ties
1This may depends also on the schooling system, in the South of Europe less children
a r ee n r o l l e di nu n i v e r s i t i e sa n do b t a i n e dad egree (the proportion of graduated among
24-34 years old isl 12% against 34% in France and 35- 39% in Belgium, Denmark) while
the universities are widely diﬀused and mostly publicly provided reducing the incentive to
move for achieving a good education..
2According to Reher (1998) these diﬀerences have historical roots. The Northern Eu-
ropean pattern of “weak family ties” and early transition to adulthood is linked to the
medieval habit of leaving the parental home early for agricultural work or to become a
servant. On the contrary, in Southern Europe, the “strong family ties” pattern was char-
acterized by extensive periods of co-residence parents and adult children, in some areas
e x t e n d i n gt ot h ew h o l el i f e .
33G e n d e r d i ﬀerences in leaving home
The diﬀerence in age- young adults leave parental homes by gender has
been mainly attributed to the diﬀerence in age at ﬁrst marriage (2-3 years)
while factors determining the cohabitation decision are not expected to af-
fect daughters and sons in a diﬀerent way. Given the similarities of human
capital accumulation, one could expect that young women’s transition to
adulthood would not be diﬀerent from young men. Recent analysis of edu-
cation attainment by gender in Italy and Southern Europe have shown that
while women ﬁnish school earlier than men and in large proportion ﬁnd a
job immediately after school, they often end up accepting worse jobs both
in terms of pay and contract type (Cammelli 2007).
In most of the literature on coresidence, the gender dimension has been
measured by a dummy variable which in most cases appears to be correlated
positively with the likelihood of leaving home. However, when analyzing
daughters and sons.separately, some relevant diﬀerences emerge. Aasve et
al (2001), for example, have shown that individual as well household re-
sources have diﬀerent impacts for men and women and these impacts are
diﬀerent across countries. While in Social Democratic welfare states income
and employment play a insigniﬁcant role for both daughters and sons, in
Southern European are more important for daughters .In order to explore
these issues further, we analyze also important institutional factors which
characterize the diﬀerent welfare states.
Why is this important? The analysis of the cohabitation decision of
adult children by gender has several important implications. While some
of the implications are relevant for the entire population, others are more
crucial for women and others more crucial for men.The delayed transition to
adulthood has key implications for the age structure of the population and
for the labor force, on the dependency ratio, and through these channels
on aggregate productivity. A late transition into adulthood reduces the
lifetime economic opportunities for individuals. Even if a prolonged co-
residence with parents might relax liquidity constraints and encourage the
accumulation of more human capital, if the transition is delayed for too long,
learning abilities and motivation may be impaired, and the individual may
get used to depend on others for his economic well being and security. More
speciﬁcally, prolonged co-residence with parents might raise the reservation
wage and delay entry into stable jobs.(Billari and Tabellini 2008)
For women a late transition to adulthood implies delay in independence
related to a delay in cohabitation, marriage and fertility. This late transition
has a negative eﬀe c to fb i r t hr a t ei nt h ec a s ew h i c hi nt u r ni n ﬂuences the
4speed at which population ages. Southern European countries have the
highest median age at leaving home as well as the highest median age at
parenthood, while fertility is among the lowest, with a clear trend towards
further postponement 3. The average age at ﬁrst birth is also important
because it inﬂuences the total number of children a woman might have as
well as the population’s size and future growth. If a ﬁrst child is born to
a mother in her thirties there is not much time left to have a large family,
while mother’s age is also a factor aﬀecting birth weight and birth defects.
Finally, for men a slower transition to adulthood may be critical also
for the household division of labour, implying that they would accumulate
little experience of sharing household chores with partners with potential
eﬀect on their wives’s labour supply, career and the likelihood of having a
child especially in countries where child care services are less widespread
and/ore more expensive (Esping Andersen et al ,2007). Recent time use
data show that Southern European husbands contribute less to housework
and the excessive burden on women can be considered an important cause
of Southern European low fertility.(Dalla Zuanna 2004 pg 118).
4D a t a d e s c r i p t i o n
In our empirical analysis we use the ECHP, a longitudinal survey coordinated
and supported by EUROSTAT. The survey involves a representative sample
of households and individuals interviewed for eight years (1994-2001) in each
of the 15 European countries (EU-15) . The standardized methodology and
procedure in data collection yield comparable information across countries,
making the ECHP a unique source of information for cross-countries analyses
at the European level. The aim of the survey, in fact, is to provide a compa-
rable information on EU population, representative both at the longitudinal
and the crosswise level. The data collected cover a wide range of topics on
living conditions (income, employment, poverty and social exclusion, hous-
ing, health, migration, and other social indicators). The unit of analysis of
the ECHP are the family and, within the households, all individuals older
than 16, even if it is possible to retrieve information (mainly demographic
information) also on children under 16. The ECHP has many advantages: it
covers the whole population, including non-working persons; as a household
data set, it includes a lot of useful and harmonized information (for example
3An increasing tendency to postpone births emerge in Italy where children live longer
with their parents: mean age of women at childbirth was 28.5 years in 1996 and 31.0 in
2006 (Eurostat 2008)
5number and age of children, or marital status). Moreover, it is possible to
link household-level information to individual data to study, for instance,
the labor supply decisions of the female partner in a couple accounting for
her own personal characteristics but also for those of her partner.A great
deal of eﬀort was devoted to harmonize the survey characteristics, but these
may vary across countries.
The main question is how to carry out valid inference about population’s
parameters of interest when data subject to unit nonresponse. Nicoletti and
Peracchi (2002) ﬁnd three main causes of survey nonparticipation in the
ECHP: the refusal to cooperate, the contact failure and the ineligibility.
Their analysis of cross-country diﬀerences in survey participation rates tries
to identify the role played by diﬀerences in the socio-demographic composi-
tion of national populations and in the characteristics of the data collection
process. They ﬁnd that several individual and household characteristics such
as number of children, the length of residence at the current address, home
ownership and household income have good predictive power
For our empirical analysis we select fourteen countries of the dataset,
representative of the diﬀerent geographical areas of Europe For the fourteen
countries we consider all available waves, creating an unbalanced panel. We
also select all households in which adult children are in the age range 18-34
and are observed living with parents for at least one wave4.
The ﬁrst group of variables that we consider regards personal character-
istics: adult children’s age and squared age, adult children’s gender and a
dummy variable controlling for third educational level (college degree and
further). Table 1 reports coresidence rates and the proportion of children
with university degrees, by single country and gender. In all countries, cores-
idence rates are larger for men and in some, as Denmark and Finland, the
percentage of men coresiding is up to 10 percent higher than that of women.
Figure 2, which plots the coresidence pattern by age and gender, for each
single country, describes how gender diﬀerences in children’s living arrange-
ments distribute along their life: while for countries as Belgium, Denmark,
Netherlands and UK behavioral discrepancies smooth away, in others, as
Greece or Austria they still stay at their thirties. However, the proportion
of third level education reported in Table 1 is greater for women in most
countries. The second group of variables includes parental characteristics.
Several measures of income are included in the ECHP, both for the parents
and children. We focus on annual incomes, rather than monthly incomes.
4In the Appendix we report the age distribution of adult children coresiding for at least
one wave.
6All incomes relate to the year prior to the survey.5 To capture non lineari-
ties we include also quadratic measure of fathers’ income (See for a detailed
analysis of parents and children incomes Le Blanc and Wolﬀ , 2006).
The third group of variables includes family composition: number of sib-
lings living in the household and presence of grandparents.These variables
may indicate more caring responsability, but also more overcrowded living
conditions. Table 2 contains descriptive statistics concerning those house-
hold characteristics, regardless of the children’s living arrangement. The
average values reported for every selected variable show a wide heterogene-
ity across EU countries.
The information given by the ECHP dataset has been augmented by
additional information taken from various statistical sources. In particu-
lar, we consider a labor market indicator, computed on the basis of annual
female and male unemployment rates deﬁned at the regional level and a
proxy for the local marriage market, i.e. the local sex ratio computed as
the probability of ﬁnding a partner of the same age band in the region of
residence (they both are computed from the EUROSTAT REGIO dataset,
years 1994-2001). We also examine the loan to value ratio, which measures
the availability of mortgage ﬁnance by country: it refers to conventional
home-purchase loans to ﬁrst-time buyers. Even though the loan to value
ratio might have changed during a decade, we consider the average values
for two decades, i.e. the 1990s and 2000s as reported in Chiuri and Jappelli
(2003) and in Maclennan et al. (1998). The country average values for the
three indicators are reported in Table 3, colums 1-3.
Following the standard time invariant grouping of the countries con-
sidered (Esping Andersen 1999), we combine them in four groups: South-
ern European countries (Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain), Central West-
European countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands), Northern Continental European countries (Denmark and
Finland) and Northern non-continental European countries (the U.K. and
Ireland).The four groups of European countries identify not only geograph-
ical contiguity, but also similar culture and welfare states. We also consider
an alternative and time varying measure of the country welfare state. In
particular, we include the annual youth social expenditures as percentage
of total public expenditures Computed on the basis of the OECD SOCX
5The ECHP breaks down total income in three mutually exclusive categories, referred
to as public income, work income, and private (non-work) income. The ﬁrst category
comprises in particular social insurance receipts, family allowances, and sickness or inva-
lidity beneﬁts.Work income refers to wage and salary earnings or self-employment income.
Non-work private income includes private transfers from other household members.
7(2006),youth social expenditure includes housing, active labor market poli-
cies and policies for other contingencies related to youth such as income
support programs. This proxy (Table 3 column 4) shows that Southern
European welfare states are less oriented towards helping young people to
start out and become economically independent when compared to Northen
European countries.
5 Methodological Framework
In our model, the living arrangements of adult children are the outcome
not only of personal and household characteristics, but also of variables re-
lated to the characteristics of the socio-economic and cultural environment
in which the individual and the household live. The econometric speciﬁca-
tion of the coresidence decision rule is assumed to be a quasi-reduced form
representation of the solution to the individual child’s optimization problem.
As is common, a latent variable structure is assumed. Let the net value of
co-residence with parents for an adult child in period t be given by:
L∗
i,t = Hi,tβ1 + HHi,tβ2 + Ei,tβ3 + Ii,tβ4 + Wiβ5 + ui,t, (1)
where Hi,t is a row vector containing the observed variables measuring child
i’s human capital, age and gender at time t. HHi,t is the vector of house-
hold characteristics at time t for child i, and includes variables such as the
number of children in the household, the presence of grandparents, and par-
ents’ income. Ei,t is the vector of variables describing the socio-economic
environment (labor market characteristics, marriage market, the degree of
ﬁnancial market development, which is proxied by the down payment ratio)
that child i lives in at time t. The vector Ei,t varies by country and year,
but is the same for all individuals surveyed in a particular year and country.
The last group of vectors are Ii,t and Wi.T h eﬁrst one varies by the country
that i lives in and time t, a n dc o n t a i n st h ey o u t hs o c i a lp o l i c ye x p e n d i t u r e
as a percent of total public expenditure. The Wi vector is a set of dummy
variables that delineates the four groups of countries. Finally, the term ui,t is
a disturbance term, the distributional properties of which will be discussed
below.
Deﬁne the (dependent) variable di,t =1if i coresides with his/her parents
at time t, and set di,t =0if not. Then we have that
di,t =1⇔ L∗
i,t > 0.
8We assume that the disturbances can be written as follows:
ui,t = ηi + εi,t.
where εi,t is independently and identically distributed as a logistic random
variable for all (i,t). We assume that the permanent component of each dis-
turbance term, ηi, is potentially not independently distributed with respect
to all of the observable characteristic si n c l u d e do nt h er i g h th a n ds i d eo fi t s
respective equation. Using the estimator that we employ, no assumptions
need be made regarding ηi except that it be time-invariant.
Our main interest lies in examining the impacts of the institutional envi-
ronment, indicators of individual and family characteristics, as well as other
factors assumed unobservable to the analyst. One of the limitations of the
economic analysis of coresidence is, in fact, the omission of factors such as
tastes, and other individual and family-speciﬁc traits -for example conﬂict,
strictness and other important factors in explaining the decision to stay or
leave home. Many, or most, of these individual-speciﬁcf a c t o r sa ﬀecting the
decision are unobservable to the researcher. Under our logistic speciﬁcation
of the disturbance εi,t, it is well known that the probability that child i will
coreside with his/her parents at time t is given by
p(di,t =1 |Xi,t,ηi)=
exp(Xi,tβ + ηi)
1+e x p ( Xi,tβ + ηi)
,i =1 ,...,N; t =1 ,...,T;
where Xi,t is the vector of all of the covariates associated with individual
i in period t (this vector contains all of the sub-vectors discussed when we
presented (1) and β is a (unknown) conformable parameter vector.
We use a ﬁxed eﬀects logit estimator to consistently estimate a subvec-
tor of β, which consists of coeﬃcients associated with variables in Xi,t that
vary over time for at least some inidividuals in the sample. Chamberlain
(1980) deﬁned a conditioning scheme that transforms the data in such a way
that the terms (η) are eliminated and the simultaneity problem is avoided.
The outcome of this conditioning is that coeﬃcients associated with time
invariant characteristics cannot be identiﬁed. Other parameters will be iden-
tiﬁable, and will be robust with respect to any form of association between
the observable heterogeneity (i.e., the variation on the manner in which the
unobservable heterogeneity is related to observable heterogeneity. The es-
timator works oﬀ of timing variability. The conditioning scheme is to look
at the relative likelihood of living with parents in period t given that the
individual lived with the parents in exactly one of the periods. Thus, only
individuals who lived with parents in one of the periods are used to estimate
9the identiﬁed subvector of β. The beneﬁt of this reduction in sample size is
the ability to robustly estimate the identiﬁed subvector of β. The estimates
are invariant with respect to the dependence between η and the covariates.
For purposes of our analysis, this is an extremely attractive feature. We
know that countries vary greatly in the proportion of adult children who
live with their parents6.S o m e o f t h i s d i ﬀerences may be accounted for in
terms of diﬀerences in observable characteristics of the countries. Most of
the diﬀerences will be produced by diﬀerences in the distribution of η across
countries, however. The diﬀerent distributions of η across countries will have
no impact on our estimates of the identiﬁed subvector of β. By contrast,
if we were to estimate a cross-section logit speciﬁcation of the probability
of living with ones parents, all parameter estimates would be inconsistent
under this scenario. Even within a country as long as selection (or attrition)
is a function of unobservable factors it would not matter for the consistency
of our estimates. The cost of using this rather ﬂexible estimation method
is the inability to determine the eﬀect of variables which do not vary over
time on the probability of coresiding in any given period. From the point
of view of conducting policy analysis, which typically requires having access
to estimates of all behavioral parameters, this may be a problem.
6 Empirical Results
Table 4 shows the empirical results of the ﬁxed eﬀects logit model by gender.
T h en e g a t i v ec o e ﬃcient on age appears to be larger and more signiﬁcant for
daughters. Having a tertiary education is positive for daughters and sons,
while parental income is not statistically signiﬁcant on either sex. Both vari-
ables describing the family structure, such the number of siblings as well the
presence of grandparents in the household increases the likelihood of coabit-
ing and the impacts are larger for daughters. The coeﬃcients related to the
l a b o rm a r k e ta n dt h ec r e d i tm a r k e tf or housing are statistically signiﬁcant
only for daughters while the other factors have a similar eﬀects..
In Table 5 and Table 6 we report the estimates by countries’ groups.
Table 5 reports the estimates for Northern countries (Continental and non
Continental). Own education coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant only for
sons both in Northern non continental and Northern continental countries
as well as fathers’ income coeﬃcient. Tertiary education increases the likeli-
hood of cohabiting with parents, while greater family resources is associated
with a greater likelihood of leaving home.
6See Table A in Appendix
10The number of siblings increases the probability of remaining in the
parental home only for daughters in both contexts, while the presence of
grandparents has no signiﬁcant impact, conﬁrming the existence of weak
intergenerational ties In Northern countries where elderly coresidence with
oﬀspring encompasses a smaller proportion, the well-being of the elderly is
based on residential autonomy or on private or public nursing homes, which
are normally paid for by public funds, by insurance policies, or directly from
the savings of the elderly themselves. In both contexts, the family plays a
modest role in providing elderly care
Being in a more favourable marriage market increases daughters’ like-
hood of leaving home in Northen continental countries, while facing a more
diﬃcult labor market characterized by higher unemployment rates increase
the probability of remaining home. More generous social expenditure for
youth increase the chances of leaving of daughters and sons in Northern
non continental. In the liberal regimes, while sons’ home-leaving home de-
cisions depend more on individual and parental characteristics, daughters’
decisions more on the environmental conditions. In the socio-democratic
regimes where leaving home early is the norm, individual, parental as well
as environmental factors are almost irrelevant.
Table 6 reports the results for Central West and Mediterranean countries.
The coeﬃcients on individual characteristics are similar (though larger in
magnitude), while the impact of fathers’ income is signiﬁcant only Mediter-
ranean countries. The coeﬃcient appears to be diﬀerent by gender: positive
for sons and negative for daughters. More family resources encourage daugh-
ters to leave and sons to remain home. Another peculiarity in Mediterranean
countries concerns the relationship with family structure. Both the presence
of siblings and grandparents are signiﬁcant and imply a greater chance of
coresidence for daughters and for sons. This result, indicating stronger fam-
ily ties, is in line with Bettio et al. (2006) which have shown that in Southern
Europe the responsibility of elderly parents rests upon their children espe-
cially their adult daughters.
All environmental factors are more statistically signiﬁcant for daughters
in both contexts. The coeﬃcient related to youth social expenditure is not
signiﬁcant, probably due to the lower levels of expenditures.
For each of the speciﬁcations estimated, we also conducted a log likeli-
hood ratio test to determine the degree to which the impact of individual and
institutional characteristics on the rate of home leaving diﬀers by gender.
Given the large sample size, it may be expected that statistically signiﬁ-
cant diﬀerences are likely to be found. However, if gender diﬀerences are
only reﬂected in the constant term of the index function upon which the
11conditional logit estimator is based, this eﬀect should be eliminated by the
pseudo-diﬀerencing upon which the estimator is based. We found that in all
speciﬁcations tested, there were signﬁcant gender diﬀerences. This indicates
that there are signiﬁcant, both statistically and behaviorally, diﬀerences in
the eﬀects of covariates on the home-leaving decisions of sons and daughters.
Gender ﬁlters the impacts of all of the covariates, even the commonly shared
ones, on the likelihood of cohabitation.
6.0.1 Are daughters and sons coresiding are worse oﬀ?
We will now provide some explorative evidence on the relationship between
living arrangements and economic well-being. In this simple descriptive
analysis we compare the situation of those who have left home to the situa-
tion of those who have not left home. Figure 3a and 3b show poverty rates
by whether a young person is still living in the parental home. Poverty
rates among sons are indicated by the dark lines, and the lighter lines for
daughters who have or have not left home at the age of 25. An individual
in a given country is considered to be poor if his household’s income is less
than 60% of the contemporary median income of that country.
We notice that women who live independently are on average poorer
than men, while men are poorer when they live in the parental home. This
is coherent with empirical evidence indicating that women in order to leave
earlier accept worse jobs than men. The diﬀerences across countries are
consistent with the actual choices. In Southern European countries women
do worse when live independently and leave home later. The exception is
Denmark where also women do relatively worse when living independently
but leave earlier than in other contexts Hoever, as discussed above, leaving
home early is here basically the norm, and economic factors do not play an
important role (Aasve and Iacovou and Mencarini. 2006).
However the comparison of those who have left home to the situation
of those who have not left home does not take account that the two groups
m a yh a v ev e r yd i ﬀerent characteristics or preferences, which may underlie
a selection eﬀect in the decision to leave home. However, this evidence is
coherent with results which control for several factors. Parisi (2008) has
shown that leaving home in Southern European countries is associated with
a higher probability of having low income. The interpretation is that remain-
ing in the parental home longer increases the chances of reaching a higher
educational, qualiﬁcation and hence a better paid job. This result may be
interpreted in relationship with the existing diﬀerences in strength of family
12ties across countries as well as diﬀerences in the welfare states. In areas
with weak-family ties, where the value attributed to individualism tends to
predominate, young adults leave home early, to acquireexperiences as au-
tonomous individuals.In contexts with strong family ties, the family has an
important role in defending its members against the diﬃculties imposed by
social and economic constraints and children receive support and protection
until they leave home for good, normally for marriage,and sometimes even
later.
7C o n c l u s i o n
We have explored the diﬀerences in leaving home of daughters and sons
and the interactions with several important factors::individual character-
istics, parental resources, family structure and environmental aspects.The
relevance of these factors diﬀer signiﬁcantly by countries’ groups. While
in social democratic countries, cohabitation decisions appear to be largely
related to norms, in liberal countries depend on individual and parental
characteristics.
In Central West countries the environmental factors appear to be also
important but almost only for daughters. Finally in Mediterranean countries
all factors are quite signiﬁcant for both sons and daughters.Strong gender
diﬀerences appear both in the diﬀerent impact of family structure as well
as labor market and housing market conditions. Daughters’ cohabitation
decisions appear to be more responsive than sons.
These results, can be useful for informing policy makers regarding the
importance of crucial reforms in the area of the labor market as well as the
housing or ﬁnancial market in order to make the transition to independent
living arrangements easier, especially in Mediterranean countries. If the la-
bor market and the credit market conditions aﬀect daughters’ home-leaving
decisions more than sons’, the implementation of policies directed to allevi-
ating the credit constraints for housing rchases and increasing the availabil-
ity of jobs would increase the diﬀerences in living arrangements,.implying
further bifurcation in the transition to adulthood and later on, in the dis-
tribution of household responsibilities.
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16Figure 1 
Average age at leaving home by country: gender differences 
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Table 1  




  M  F  M  F 
        
Austria  0.92  0.86  0.02  0.04 
Belgium  0.80  0.78  0.23  0.25 
Denmark  0.60  0.50  0.06  0.09 
Finland  0.68  0.60  0.06  0.11 
France  0.79  0.72  0.22  0.25 
Germany  0.79  0.70  0.07  0.06 
Greece  0.92  0.87  0.14  0.20 
Ireland  0.90  0.87  0.14  0.17 
Italy  0.90  0.87  0.06  0.08 
Luxembourg  0.87  0.84  0.13  0.09 
Netherlands  0.75  0.68  0.02  0.03 
Portugal  0.88  0.86  0.04  0.08 
Spain  0.89  0.86  0.22  0.28 










Figure 2  




































































































































































































Table 2  










Austria  23.832  0.80  0.09 
Belgium  26.087  0.75  0.02 
Denmark  33.989  0.64  0 
Finland  34.709  0.80  0.01 
France  34.276  0.86  0.01 
Germany  25.26  0.67  0.01 
Greece  12.121  0.63  0.10 
Ireland  18.311  1.50  0.02 
Italy  16.465  0.76  0.04 
Luxembourg  30.879  0.66  0.06 
Netherlands  28.141  0.70  0 
Portugal  9.042  0.89  0.06 
Spain  13.314  0.89  0.09 




Table 3  
Indicators of local marriage and labour markets by gender. Maximum loan to value ratio for 













  [F/(M+F)] *100  M  F    
Austria  49.35  3.14  4.63  80  3.47 
Belgium  49.22  6.71  10.32  80  6.57 
Denmark  49.08  4.29  5.83  80  11.71 
Finland  48.90  7.8  8.3  80  8.37 
France  49.53  7.86  11.38  80  9.03 
Germany  48.36  8.09  9.95  80  7.22 
Greece  48.28  4.67  11.38  75  5.86 
Ireland  49.41  8.42  8.17  80  14.28 
Italy  49.51  10.83  20.76  60  1.79 
Luxembourg  49.31  1.50  3.19  60  2.25 
Netherlands  49.14  3.05  4.97  75  10.07 
Portugal  49.65  3.15  4.78  80  4.64 
Spain  49.07  11.94  23.26  80  6.19 
U.K.  48.69  5.86  4.07  95  10.08 
Note. Average Sex Ratio computed as female population over total population by country regions from REGIO 
dataset (EUROSTAT), 1994‐2001. Average unemployment rate from REGIO dataset refers to the same years and 




 Table 4  
Conditional Fixed Effect Logistic Regression.  
Dependent variable: coresident child (18-34 years old)- All countries 
 All  sample  Sons  Daughters 
VARIABLES      
    
Child Age  -1.827***  -1.209**  -2.348*** 
 (0.230)  (0.317) (0.343) 
Child age sq  0.001  -0.014*  0.008 
 (0.004)  (0.006) (0.007) 
Number of Siblings  0.817**  0.382*  1.923** 
 (0.269)  (0.254) (0.454) 
Child Education  1.068***  1.223***  0.968** 
 (0.135)  (0.195) (0.191) 
Parental income  -0.002 -0.802 -0.423 
 (0.370)  (0.647) (0.568) 
Parental income sq  0.024  0.071  -0.008 
 (0.017)  (0.031) (0.026) 
Grandparents 2.157**  1.522*  3.242** 
 (0.436)  (0.537) (0.795) 
Sexratio 0.002*  0.003*  0.002* 
 (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Unemployment 0.059*  0.399  0.122** 
 (0.028)  (0.043)  (0.0394) 
Downpayment 0.002*  0.001  0.005** 
 (0.01)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Youth Policies  -0.554***  -0.569***  -0.535** 
 (0.080)  (0.111) (0.119) 
    
Observations 21805  10747  11058 
























 Table 5- Conditional Fixed Effect Logistic Regression.  
 Per group of countries and gender – North Europe 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 












      
Child age  -0.603  -1.474**  -1.738  -1.158** 
 (0.559)  (0.609)  (2.172) (0.734) 
Child  age2  -0.023* -0.0068 -0.027  0.097 
 (0.011)  (0.0131) (0.028)  (0.063) 
Number of 
Siblings 
0.270 1.893**  3.396 3.703* 
 (0.258)  (0.630)  (2.161) (1.556) 
Tertiary 
education 
1.149*** 0.461  0.331*  0.643 
 (0.275)  (0.270)  (0.142) (1.966) 
Parental 
Income 
-0.844 **  -0.850  -0.246*  -0.652 
 (0.199)  (0.335)  (0.107) (0.408) 
Parental 
income sq 
0.647** 0.095  0.132  .299 
 (0.227)  (.145)  (0.525)  (.188) 
Grandparents 1.004  -1.166     
  (1.180) (1.038)    
Sexratio -0.002  0.007  0.013  -0.047* 
 (0.002)  (0.030)  (0.025) (0.020) 
Unemployment 0.029  0.448**  0.465  -0.897 
 (0.099)  (0.123)  (0.768) (0.755) 
Downpayment -0.003  -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006) (0.002)) 
Youth policies  -.761**  -1.507***  -0.614  -1.052 
 (0.248)  (0.346)  (0.956) (0.720) 
      
Observations  1734 1522 890  834 
Number of 
newpid 
333 293 201 203 
 
 Standard  errors  in  parentheses      
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         Table 6- Conditional Fixed Effect Logistic Regression.  
 Per group of countries and gender – South Europe 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 












      
Child  age  -2.428** -3.185***  -3.431** -2.836** 
 (0.539)  (0.517)  (0.927) (1.033) 
Child Age square  0.081  0.026**  -0.023  0.007 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.016) (0.019) 
Number of 
Siblings 
0.669 1.546 2.352*  1.437* 
  (0.532) (1.117) (0.891) (.724) 
Tertiary  Education  1.101** 1.024** 1.055  2.078** 
 (0.331)  (0.309  (0.807) (0.577) 
Parental  Income  0.155 0.270 0.857*  -0.695** 
 (0.134)  (0.161)  (0.348) (.1882) 
Parental Income sq  -0.083 -0.127 -0.407*  -0.298** 
 (0.068)  (0.091)  (0.145) (0.077) 
Grandparents  1.379  1.396* 2.377* 4.077** 
  (0.965) (.635)  (0.977) (0.728) 
Sexratio -0.002  0.003*  .008 0.0059* 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.055) (0.018) 
Unemployment  -0.041 0.156* 0.392* 0.140* 
 (0.071)  (0.062)  (0.125) (0.054) 
Downpayment  0.004 0.020*  0.007 0.002* 
 (0.003))  (0.007))  (0.010) (0.001) 
Youth  policies  -0.296  0.043 0.357 -0.033 
 (0.200)  (0.226)  (0.262) (0.028) 
      
Observations  5846 5844 2276 2621 
Number of newpid  1180  1194  444  495 
 
 Standard  errors  in  parentheses      
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         Figure 3a  
Poverty rate for young adults independently living till the age of 25, observed at later years (26‐34) 





































 Appendix Table A .Comparison by age of total 18-34 sample of adult children and sample of those 
coresiding at least for one wave.  
Country 
 
  18‐19  20‐24  25‐29  30‐34  No of obs. 
ECHP sample  5.86  11.85  28.22  54,07  11,476  Austria 
Coresid.for 1+ yr   8.80  20.15  37.93  33.92  6,054 
ECHP sample  5.56  10.32  26.09  58.03  12,378   
Belgium  Coresid.for 1+ yr  9.39  20.99  42.22  27.40  5,749 
ECHP sample  4.66  9.74  26.78  58.81  10,955   
Denmark  Coresid.for 1+ yr  12.21  28.21  44.74  14.74  2,964 
ECHP sample  7.72  15.29  28.87  48.12  12,312   
Finland  Coresid.for 1+ yr  13.51  30.46  40.56  15.47  5,131 
ECHP sample  5.83  11.34  29.88  52.96  29,659   
France  Coresid.for 1+ yr  9.89  22.11  43.39  24.61  13,216 
ECHP sample  4.93  9.64  25.11  60.32  31,260   
Germany  Coresid.for 1+ yr  9.26  20.78  38.78  31.18  13.181 
ECHP sample  6.37  12.27  29.36  52.00  24,899   
Greece  Coresid.for 1+ yr  8.06  17.64  36.60  37.70  15,728 
ECHP sample  8.04  15.31  32.85  43.80  17,255   
Ireland  Coresid.for 1+ yr  9.04  21.53  41.66  27.76  11,281 
ECHP sample  5.12  10.79  30.08  54.01  39,868   
Italy  Coresid.for 1+ yr  6.07  14.67  38.06  41.19  28,388 
ECHP sample  3.85  8.16  26.38  61.61  11,621   
Luxemb.  Coresid.for 1+ yr  5.95  15.20  37.64  41.22  5,477 
ECHP sample  5.26  9.21  23.43  62.09  20,038   
Netherl.  Coresid.for 1+ yr  12.43  26.05  42.89  18.63  6,153 
ECHP sample  6.51  13.46  33.28  46.74  24,315   
Portugal  Coresid.for 1+ yr  7.86  18.40  40.66  33.08  16,186 
  ECHP sample  5.62  12.09  30.90  51.39  38,038 Spain  Coresid.for 1+ yr  6.77  16.63  39.43  37.17  26,053 
ECHP sample  4.88  10.89  28.44  55.80  23,163   
U.K.  Coresid.for 1+ yr  9.89  21.79  41.66  26.66  7,917 
 